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O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association:
Winning the War Against Age Restrictive
Covenants but Using the Unruh
Act Cannon as a Pea
Shooter
INTRODUCTION
Since its enactment in 1959, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act1
has served the California public as a mighty cannon warring against ar-
bitrary discrimination by business establishments.2 The broad language
of the Act has purposefully insured its liberal application 3 and the courts
have found no difficulty in aiming the sites of this big gun at the housing
industry.4 Recently, two landmark decisions have resulted in the Act's
most dramatic and far-reaching assault on housing to date.
5
The first of these two, Marina Point Ltd v. Wolfson,6 not only pro-
vided the backdrop for the second, but set the stage for future consterna-
1. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1983).
2. Cf. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205,474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970) (The Unruh
Act forbids only arbitrary discrimination; exclusion based on reasonable criteria is not
prohibited).
The court in Cox held discrimination based on reasons rationally related to the
services performed was justified.
[We do not imply that the establishment may never insist that a patron
leave the premises. Clearly, an entrepreneur need not tolerate customers
who damage property, injure others, or otherwise disrupt his business. A
business establishment may, of course, promulgate reasonable deportment
regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and the fa-
cilities provided.
Id. at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (foonotes omitted).
3. In a relevant section, the Unruh Act states: "All persons ... are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations... or services in all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1983) (emphasis
added).
4. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 129 (1982) (prohibiting age restrictions in rental hous-
ing); Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1962) (building, developing, and selling homes); Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370
P.2d 321, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962) (selling and renting homes); Vargas v. Hampson, 57
Cal. 2d 479, 370 P.2d 322, 20 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1962) (real estate brokers cannot dis-
criminate in sale of real estate); Flowers v. Burnham & Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98
Cal. Rptr. 644 (Ct. App. 1971) (exclusion of boys over five years old from apartment
housing); Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309
(Ct. App. 1962) (prohibiting race discrimination in rental housing).
5. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 129 (1982); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n,
33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
6. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
129 (1982).
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tion in all planned housing developments. Viewing the age old landlord-
tenant relationship as a business, the California Supreme Court in Ma-
rina barred a landlord from discriminating against families with chil-
dren.7 As a result, "adult only" apartment complexes in California
became essentially a remnant of the past.8 With this termination of
adult only rental communities, the owners associations of many planned
housing developments, such as condominiums, 9 mobile home parks, 10
and co-operative housing complexesI' began to question the validity of
their similar age restrictive covenants and equitable servitudes.1
2
7. Id. at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 5 10-11.
8. The Marina court concluded:
The argument is launched that children clearly may be excluded from cer-
tain kinds of housing, such as housing for the aged, housing for special
classes or purposes, and therefore that the instant exclusion is justified ....
To permit such discrimination is to approve of widespread, and potentially
universal, exclusion of children from housing. Neither statute nor interpre-
tation of statute, however, sanctions the sacrifice of the well-being of chil-
dren on the altar of a landlord's profit, or possibly some tenants'
convenience.
Id. at 744-45, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511; see infra notes 135, 140-142 and
accompanying text.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 783 (Deering 1971) defines a condominium as:
[A]n estate in real property consisting of an undivided interest in common in
a portion of a parcel of real property together with a separate interest in
space in a residential, industrial or commercial building on such real prop-
erty, such as an apartment, office or store. A condominium may include m
addition a separate interest in other portions of such real property.
Additional insight into the uniqueness of condominium living is found in Seagate
Condominium Ass'n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976): "Con-
dominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub-society of necessity more re-
strictive as it pertains to use of condominium property than may be existent outside
the condominium organization."
10. "A 'mobile home park' is an area of land where two or more mobile home
sites are rented, or held out for rent, to accommodate mobile homes used for human
habitation." CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.4 (Deering Supp. 1983). See generally, Mason,
Landlord/Tenant Relations in Idaho Mobile Home Parks. Current Problems and
Needed Reforms, 16 IDAHO L. REv. 275 (1980).
11. Cooperative apartments (co-ops), although relatively new in California, are
commonplace in New York, Florida and other eastern states.
In the cooperative. . . a developer usually sells the fee along with the build-
ings and improvements erected on the land to a not-for-profit corporation
(the "cooperative apartment corporation"). The corporation then sells its
stock to individuals in proportion to the size, location and desirability of the
apartment they will occupy. In addition, the corporation enters into a "pro-
prietary lease" with each individual purchaser, granting him the exclusive
right to possess a particular unit. . . . These interrelated governing instru-
ments include bylaws, rules and regulations, and article of incorporation.
Shlopack, Legal Considerations: Condominium or Co-operative? Issues Facing the De-
veloper, 55 FLA. B.J. 105, 106 (1981).
12. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct. App. 1982),
rev'd, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983); 65 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen.
559 (1982). At the present time there are no cases involving cooperative housing, or
adult residential communities which address the question of the validity of ase re-
strictive covenants. However, due to the impact of the recent decisions it is inevitable
that such cases will present themselves to the court. See generally Marina Point Ltd.
[Vol. 20
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Staggering from the blow dealt by the court in Marina, a second as-
sault was launched in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association in
an attempt to uphold age restrictive covenants in the context of condo-minium ownership. 13 O'Connor is the second of these two landmark de-
cisions. In preparation, the California Supreme Court again loaded its
mighty Unruh Act cannon. 14 The public awaited a final resolve to the
confusion created by Marina and anticipated an opinion with uniform
application to all types of planned housing communities.' 5 Although the
great cannon was primed, powered, and ready as before, without appar-
ent reason, the court tossed aside the heavy cannon ball it could have
used and filled the great gun with pea shot.16 Even though the court hit
its mark, the resolution was incomplete;' 7 rejecting arguments that age
restrictive covenants in condominiums are the contractual creation of
private homeowners, the court found that the homeowners association of
the Village Green complex constituted a business thereby falling under
the Unruh Act.' 8 Based essentially on this sole rationale, and in this
limited context, age restrictions at Village Green suffered a quick but
painful death.' 9 Unfortunately, the pea shot was much too selective; al-
though the opportunity was presented to the court, the power of the Un-
ruh Act was not used to its full potential.20 Left totally unscathed were
such planned housing communities as mobile home parks, residential
v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 129 (1982); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct.
App. 1982), rev'd, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
13. The California Court of Appeals held: "The regulation in question is a pri-
vate contract." O'Connor, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 114.
Additionally, the opposing parties in the case before the California Supreme Court
acknowledged the restriction barring children was a restrictive covenant that ran with
the land. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790,793 n. 1, 662 P.2d
427, 428 n. 1, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 321 n. 1 (1983).
14. The California Supreme Court set forth the provisions of the Unruh Act and
then proceeded with its opinion by structuring its analysis around the Act. O'Connor
v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1983).
15. Various newspaper articles were issued after both the Marina and O'Connor
decisions to this effect. L.A. Daily J., May 10, 1983, at 1; L.A. Times, May 10, 1983
§ 1, at 1; L.A. Daily J., Sept. 24, 1981, at 1.
16. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796, 662 P.2d 427,
431, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1983).
19. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191
Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
20. The court saw the need, and had the duty to decide the issue of age restric-
tions in condominium projects, it also had the strength of the Unruh Act's legislative
history to rely upon and could have applied it with a more universal application. See
infra note 99 and accompanying text. The California Supreme Court had before it at
least one additional target of age restrictions in planned housing in regard to the
Unruh Act since the lower court had expressly relied upon certain statutes that au-
thorize "adult only" mobile home parks. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n,
183 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114 (Ct. App. 1982).
1983]
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adult communities, co-ops, and condominium developments that do not
have owners associations.
2 1
This Note will examine the aftermath of O'Connor, and the soundness
and usefulness of its rationale in future application. Additionally, the
various means by which the decision may be circumvented will be dis-
cussed and finally a more workable and universal solution will be
proposed.
To carry out this examination, this Note will first explore the Unruh
Act itself, its inclusion of age as a protected class, and its extension to the
general housing industry. Secondly, the effect and import of the
O'Connor decision will be analyzed in light of projected future develop-
ments in the planned housing sector. Here, selective and limited ration-
ale of the O'Connor holding will be questioned for soundness. The third
section will shift from the technical, legal aspects of the Unruh Act to
review other California statutory authority which expressly allows "rea-
sonable" restrictive convenants. Within this section, "reasonableness"
will be tested for consistency with an eye toward a more universal ap-
proach for future application.
Finally, this Note will discuss various solutions and policy considera-
tions and conclude that restrictive covenants can only exclude children
in rare circumstances and under strictly supervised situations. Since Cal-
ifornia courts have not seen the need to include a constitutional analysis
to resolve age restrictive covenant conflicts, this Note will accordingly
limit itself to relevant statutory and case authorities.
22
21. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
22. The O'Connor and the Marina decisions avoided any discussion of constitu-
tional issues, although equal protection and due process arguments were raised. The
courts instead opted to consider only California statutory and case law. Marina Point
Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,724, 640 P.2d 115, 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 498 (1982);
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal,
Rtr. 320 (1983). But cf. San Jose Country Club Apartments v. County of Santa
Clara, 137 Cal. App. 3d 948, 187 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Ct. App. 1982), decided only five
months after the Marina decision. In San Jose the court addressed the alleged consti-
tutional violations and upheld a county ordinance designed to prohibit discrimination
in rental housing "on the basis of age, parenthood, pregnancy, or presence of a minor
child." Among the constitutional issues allegedly violated by the ordinance were
rights to association, expression, privacy, travel, speech, due process, and equal pro-
tection. Id. at 954-55, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 495-96. Justice Rouse dissented on the sole
ground that the cause of action was moot due to the holding in Marina. Id. at 956,
187 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97 (Rouse, J., dissenting).
For an additional discussion of some constitutional issues on age restrictive cove-
nants in housing, see Note, The Enforceability of 4ge Restrictive Covenants in Condo-
minium Developments, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1397, 1408-51 (1981); Travalio, Suffer The
Little Children-But Not In My Neighborhood- .4 Constitutional View of.4ge-Restric-
tive Housing, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 295 (1979); Note, Judicial Review of Condominium
Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. RaV. 647, 656-58 (1981).
[Vol. 20
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I. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF THE UNRUH ACT
To properly evaluate the present effect and impact of the Unruh Act
upon age restrictive convenants in planned communities and the corre-
sponding authority of the O'Connor court to act, it is first vital to under-
stand the Act's legislative and historical background. 23 In this historic
light, two essential areas will be considered: (a) age as a protected class
under the Unruh Act, and (b) the Unruh Act's inclusion and treatment
of the housing industry as a whole.
A. Age as a Class of Arbitrary Discrimination
The modem version of the Unruh Act does not specifically mention
age as a protected class; it reads today as follows:
This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh
Civil Rights Act.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ances-
try, or national origin are entitled to the full and equal accom-
modations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or
privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or
which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race,
religion, ancestry, or national origin.24
In 1974, the word "sex" was added to the Unruh Act to appear wher-
ever the expression "color, race, religion, ancestry or national origin"
appeared. 25 Despite this single addition to the statutory language of the
Act, it has been increasingly expanded by interpretation to include other
classifications such as occupational and marital status and the number of
children in a family.26 Furthermore, the courts have expanded its appli-
cation to groups such as students,27 persons who associate wiih blacks, 28
welfare recipients, 29 persons of immoral character,30 homosexuals,31 and
23. Due to the extensive background of the Act, only those historical considera-
tions relating to age restrictive covenants will be discussed. For a more extensive
history, see Horowitz, California Equal Rights Statute, 33 S. CAL. L. RV. 260 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Horowitz]; see also 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 70 (1976); 58 Op. Cal.
Att'y Gen. 608 (1975).
24. CAL. Clv. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1983).
25. The addition of the word "sex," without the addition of the word "age," has
since given rise to arguments that the legislature did not intend the inclusion of "age"
in the Act. See 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975).
26. 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975). The Attorney General concluded the
forms of discrimination specifically enumerated in the Act were illustrative rather
than restrictive. Id. at 609. See also 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 70 (1976) for specific
reference to marital status and number of children.
27. 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 70 (1976).
28. Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d 125, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1976).
29. 59 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 70 (1976).
30. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
19831
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even persons of "unconventional appearance," as presented in the case
of In re Cox.
32
In Cox, the petitioner, who wore long hair and dressed in an uncon-
ventional manner, was arrested and charged with violating a municipal
trespass ordinance after refusing to leave a shopping center. The propri-
etor argued he could refuse service to anyone. The California Supreme
Court held that although a business operator need not tolerate customers
who damage property, injure others, or otherwise disrupt his business,
the Unruh Act forbids a business establishment from arbitrariy exclud-
ing a prospective customer. 33 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
ruled on how far the Unruh Act was to extend by holding:
"[I]dentification of particular bases of discrimination-color, race, reli-
gion, ancestry, and national origin . . . is illustrative rather than restric-
tive."' 34 It is therefore evident that the Unruh Act's protection will
continue to expand as additional groups test its application.
Among the cases and opinions that have cited Cox with approval 35 is
the landmark decision of Marina Point Ltd v. Wolpson.36 In Marina, the
owner of the large Marina Point apartment complex instituted an unlaw-
ful detainer action against the Wolfsons who failed to vacate the prem-
ises at the expiration of an extended lease. The sole reason for the
landlord's refusal to renew the lease was the presence of a newly born
child on the premises, in violation of a no-children restriction. 37 The
Wolfsons contended that their child had done nothing to warrant the
eviction and that the restriction violated the Unruh Act.38 The munici-
pal court, however, upheld the exclusionary policy and granted the re-
quested relief by concluding that the Unruh Act's protection applied
only to the limited number of groups specifically mentioned within the
language of the Act itself.39 The California Supreme Court reversed. 40
Citing Cox, the court came to the conclusion that age was readily in-
cluded as a protected class under the Unruh Act.41
Subsequently, the California Court of Appeals in O'Connor disre-
garded the interpretation which the California Supreme Court had given
to the Unruh Act in Cox while also contradicting the Supreme Court's
31. Stoumen v. Reilly, 37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951).
32. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
33. Id. at 217, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
34. Id. at 216, 474 P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d, 662 P.2d 432,
191 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983); Winchell v. English, 62 Cal. App. 3d 125, 133 Cal. Rptr. 20
(Ct. App. 1976); 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975); 56 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 546 (1973).
36. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
37. Id. at 726-27, 640 P.2d at 118, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
38. Id. at 730, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
39. Id. at 732, 640 P.2d at 121, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
40. Id. at 745, 640 P.2d at 132, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
41. See id. at 732, 640 P.2d at 121, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
[Vol. 20
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inclusion of "age" in Marina.42 O'Connor's facts mirror those of Marina
except that age restrictive covenants were challenged in the setting of
condominium ownership.43 The O'Connors were homeowners in a six
hundred unit condominium development that restricted occupancy to
persons over eighteen years of age. Four years after purchasing their
unit, the O'Connors had an infant son. Following shortly thereafter, the
homeowners association gave the O'Connors written notice of their in-
tent to enforce the age restrictive covenant against them. The O'Connors
responded by filing an action to have the age restrictive covenant de-
clared invalid. The trial court upheld the restrictive covenant and this
holding was later affinmed by the California Court of Appeals.44 The
appellate court presented various arguments that purported to distin-
guish Marina's inclusion of age under the Unruh Act,45 but the Califor-
nia Supreme Court did not address these contentions.46 Since the
appellate court's arguments present a potential conflict with the inclu-
sion of age under the protection of the Unruh Act, they warrant review
for their validity. The refuting of these arguments is essential to estab-
lish the absolute power the California Supreme Court utilized in making
its decision in O'Connor.47
One argument launched by the appellate court was that a number of
bills had been rejected by the California Legislature which would have
prohibited discrimination against children in all forms of housing.
48
The failure of the legislature to pass these bills was used as authority to
establish intent opposing such legislation. 49 Citing unpassed bills as au-
thority, however, amounts to an exercise in speculation and conjecture.50
42. O'Connor, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15. It is obvious that the appellate court was
aware of the Cox and Marina holdings since O'Connor was previously remanded
from the California Supreme Court to be decided pursuant to the Marina decision.
Id. at 113 (1982).
43. Id. at 113. See also, O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d
790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
44. O'Connor, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
45. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
46. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 320 (1983).
47. In order for the California Supreme Court to have authority to strike down
age restrictive covenants in all forms of planned housing, it must first be established
that the court had omnipotent authority to deal with age restrictions in the first place.
48. Cal. S. 359, Reg. Sess. (1977-78) and Cal. S. 440, Reg. Sess. (1979-80) are
essentially the same bill and solicit protection against discrimination of children from
any dwelling containing two or more units. In addition, they both encourage the
exception of a child free environment for persons of age sixty and older.
Although not cited by the Marina or O'Connor courts, Cal. A.B. 300, Reg. Sess.
(1977-78) can also be added to the list of unpassed bills attempting to protect families
with children from housing discrimination. This bill, however, added the exception
of unsafe facilities as a reasonable basis to exclude children.
49. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal Rptr. 111, 115 (Ct. App.
1982).
50. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,735 n. 7, 640 P.2d 115, 123 n. 7,
180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 505 n. 7 (1982).
1983]
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California courts have traditionally been reluctant to view them as indic-
ative of legislative intent due to the many outside variables which are
involved in their enactment.5
1
Additionally, the O'Connor appellate court held that certain sections
of the California Government Code,52 relating essentially to employ-
ment discrimination, were present at the time of the 1974 Unruh Act
amendment, and specifically included "age" as a protected class.5 3 The
appellate court reasoned that since age was set forth specifically in the
Government Code, but not incorporated into the 1974 amendment of the
Unruh Act, the legislature "demonstrated that when it intended to refer
to age, it knew how to do so."'54 Such a conclusion is without merit. As
the Marina decision points out, the Unruh Act amendment of 1974,55
was preceded by the 1970 Cox 56 decision. The legislature was well
aware of the liberal construction of the Unruh Act by the Cox court.
5 7
Had it disagreed with the Cox interpretation, or had it desired to con-
strict the reach of the Unruh Act in a manner incompatible with Cox, it
presumably would have done so.58 This application of the Cox case was
cited with approval in the concurring decision by California Supreme
Court Justice Broussard in O'Connor.59
Accordingly, the type of analysis by the appellate court is left without
valid authority to support an exclusion of "age" from those groups pro-
tected from discrimination by the Unruh Act. Such an exclusion would
fly in the face of the legislative intent,60 the Unruh Act's history,61 and
recent decisions of the California courts. 62 There is no doubt the Unruh
Act protects age discrimination, and the California Supreme Court in
O'Connor had every right to proceed without hesitation. As concluded
in Marina:
To permit such discrimination is to approve of widespread, and
potentially universal, exclusion of children from housing.
Neither statute nor interpretation of statute, however, sanctions
the sacrifice of the well-being of children on the altar of a land-
51. Id.
52. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12920, 12941, 12942 (Deering 1982).
53. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111, 115 (Ct. App.
1982).
54. Id. at 116.
55. The 1974 amendment added the word "sex" to the list of specifically enumer-
ated classes protected from discrimination.
56. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
57. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
58. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 735, 640 P.2d 115, 123, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 505 (1982).
59. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 798, 662 P.2d 427,
432, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 325 (1983) (Broussard, J., concurring).
60. See also infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
61. Id.
62. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20
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lord's profit, or possibly some tenants' convenience. 63
Having concluded that age is a class protected by the Unruh Act, it is
now necessary to turn to the Unruh Act's application to the housing in-
dustry, and then to its more specific application to planned housing
communities.
B. Inclusion of the General Housing Industry Under the Unruh Act
The original version of the bill which was presented to the California
State Legislature, and later became the Unruh Act, enumerated among
its business activities protected against discrimination, the right to
purchase real property.64 Despite this express attempt to include this
aspect of the housing industry, the first enactment of 1959 did not do
so. 65 The elimination of all references to real estate sales (and any other
specifically mentioned business activity or business establishment) was
deliberate. 66 The legislature deemed specific references as mere surplus-
age in view of the broad language of the Act as finally passed; the intent
was simply to protect the public in any business setting.67 Indeed, the
protection offered in the original bill included private or public groups,
organizations and associations as well.
68
True to the legislature's intent, the Unruh Act has been liberally ap-
plied. As illustrated by extensive case law,69 it is also clearly evident that
California courts have not hesitated to extend the Unruh Act's broad
application to business activities within the housing industry such as the
63. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,745, 640 P.2d 115, 129, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 496, 511 (1982).
64. As introduced, the bill read in part: "All citizens within the jurisdiction of
this State, no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, are
entitled to the full and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages . . . to
purchase realproperty; and to obtain the services of any professional person, group or
association." Cal. A.B. 594, Reg. Sess. (1959) (emphasis added); Horowitz, supra note
23, at 265 n. 31.
65. 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424. See also Horowitz, supra note 23.
66. Horowitz, supra note 23.
67. Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 469, 370 P.2d 313, 316, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 609, 612 (1962). Note also that the predecessor to the Unruh Act was an 1897
codification of the common law which specifically included: "full and equal ac-
comodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating-
houses, barber-shops, bath-houses, theatres, skating rinks, and all other places of pub-
lic accommodation or amusement .... " 1893 Cal. Stat. 137. See generally
Horowitz, supra note 23.
Additionally, California Civil Code section four premises the entire civil code by
stating: "The code establishes the law of this state respecting the subjects to which it
relates, and its provisions are to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects
and to promote justice." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (Deering 1971) (emphasis added).
68. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795 n. 5, 662 P.2d
427, 430 n. 5, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 n. 5 (1983).
69. See supra note 2; see also Swam v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 286 (Ct. App. 1962) (rental of triplex units is a "business establishment").
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rental or sale of real property.70 The inclusion of housing is not only
proper, but in complete harmony with the principles upon which the Un-
ruh Act was founded.
Despite its general application to the housing industry, it is essential to
note that until O'Connor, the Unruh Act had not been applied to the
rental or sale of owner occupied, single family residences in any con-
text.71 The rationale for this omission has simply been that a private
residence lacks the necessary business characteristics. 72 However, with
the unique structure of condominium living73 and other planned com-
munities, such as mobile home parks,74 co-operative apartment hous-
ing,75 and "adult only" residential neighborhoods which combine
private ownership with group control, it became important to determine
whether these planned communities are taken out of the private sector
and placed in the realm of the business establishment. Such was the
challenge which faced the California Supreme Court in O'Connor.
II. THE EFFECT AND MEANING OF O'CONNOR TO PLANNED HOUSING
COMMUNITIES
A. Searchingfor the "Business Establishment"
In order to strike down age restrictive covenants in condominiums
under the authority of the Unruh Act, the court needed to find at least
three elements: 1) arbitrary discrimination, 2) of age as a class, 3) by a
business establishment.76 Since the first two elements of this triad were
70. "The law is well settled that the Act is applicable to the sale and rental of real
property." 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975).
71. "Civil Code Sec. 51 [the Unruh Act], includes within its scope owners of
triplexes, owners of duplexes, owners of non-owner occupied single family dwellings
... whose accommodations are offered for sale, rent, or lease for income or gain."
56 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 546 (1973).
The Supreme Court of California in Hill v. Miller, 64 Cal. 2d 757, 415 P.2d 33, 51
Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966), however, did not extend section 51 to single family residences
but left open the option for an alteration by stating: "Although the state, by action of
the Legislature or the People, may make such private acts of discrimination unlawful,
[tenancy in a private residence] ... it has not done so." Id. at 759, 415 P.2d at 34, 51
Cal. Rptr. at 690. Thus, an option may be forthcoming that will extend the Unruh
Act into the private sector. Furthermore, in condominium developments, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, as previously stated, has extended the Unruh Act to protect
against age restrictions. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790,
662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
72. Id.
73. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 0 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
76. The court primarily relied upon its earlier decision of Marina Point Ltd. v.
Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 123, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982) cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 129 (1983) to satisfy the first of these two elements since Marina expressly in-
cluded "age" within the purview of the Unruh Act. The courts treatment of the
"business establishment" is set out extensively throughout this section. This element
is the most difficult to deal with in relation to planned housing. When the court of
appeals in O'Connor confronted this problem, it came to the conclusion, by determin-
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decided by prior law,77 the court recognized that the only real issue
before it was whether a discriminatory policy against children was being
invoked by a "business establishment. '78 Although the court could have
reached such a conclusion by various means that would have established
a more uniform guide for other types of planned communities, unfortu-
nately, the court was so taken by the concept of an owners association as
a business establishment, its holding was largely limited to that sole
criterion.7
9
It is readily apparent how the court saw the business characteristics of
the Village Green Owners Association since as most owners associations,
it: a) employed a professional property management firm, b) obtained
insurance for the benefit of all the owners, c) maintained and repaired
the common areas and facilities, and d) collected assessments.80 These
services are of unquestionable value to the condominium dweller, and
although an owners association becomes a business when it provides
such benefits, they could easily be provided by an alternative method or
by an outside company. The statutory requirements for a condominium
project do not require the existence of an owners association.8 ' Just as
the dweller of a single family detached residence does not become a busi-
ing that condominiums are not business establishments, that age restrictive covenants
do not violate the Unruh Act. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 111, 114-15 (Ct. App. 1982). In making this determination, however, the appel-
late court glazed over the inconsistent, but feasible hybrid situation presented when
an owner of a condominium subject to age restrictions rents to a family with children.
Such a situation would be warranted by the Marina decision, yet would be in viola-
tion of the condominium restrictive convenants. Such a situation would also be pres-
ent where an apartment complex is being converted to condominiums and previous
apartment dwellers are still living within the condominium community. Mobile
home parks, where the home is owned but the land rented, would also fall into this
category.
In order for a homeowner with minor children to comply with this paradox and yet
retain occupancy of his unit, he may have had to resort to extreme procedures; he
could have exchanged units with another family in the project and both families
could have "rented" from each other, or as at least one writer has suggested, the
owner "could enter into a straw man sale-leaseback transaction, whereby the seller
would rent the premises from the new purchaser." Such new purchaser might have
even been the owner's "newly formed corporation." It is essential to note, however,
that the author of the article setting forth the sale-leaseback arrangement dismissed
the arrangement by stating that the new owner "would be bound to uphold the CC &
R's as well [as the original owner]." Note, The Enforceability ofAge Restrictive Cove-
nants in Condominium Developments, 54 S. CAL. L. R v. 1397, 1458 (1982). This
dismissal is now questionable since the Marina decision bars age discrimination when
properties are rented (at least where a single landlord rents more than one unit); such
an arrangement may readily place a leased condominium under the Marina holding.
77. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 123, 180 Cal. Rptr.
496 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 129 (1983).
78. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662 P.2d 427,
430, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (1983).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
81. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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nessman merely because his hired gardner maintains his yard, neither
should a condominium dweller that hires an outside management com-
pany. It is entirely foreseeable for a condominium project to operate on
a "self-serve" arrangement and dissolve the formal association.8 2 Such
action by a condominium complex could result in a circumvention of the
restraints on age discrimination imposed by the O'Connor court. How-
ever, even if condominium projects are arguably doomed to have their
maintenance and operation carried on by an in-house owners associa-
tion, the O'Connor court could have easily structured its opinion making
the ruling applicable to other types of housing that will otherwise slip
through the cracks of the shaky foundation the court's opinion con-
structed.8 3 It would have been better for the court to recognize the vari-
ous other business characteristics of the Village Green complex. Had it
done so, the foundation could have been built upon by other forms of
housing in need of the same protection. 84
When Village Green's age restriction was upheld at the appellate level,
heavy reliance was given to the statutory authority allowing "adult only"
housing for mobile home communities.85 The California Supreme
Court was conspicuously mute regarding this apparent exception to age
restrictive convenants, and this omission has left the California public to
speculate whether mobile home parks are not businesses for purposes of
the Unruh Act. The decision could have included mobile home parks,
and other types of housing such as co-ops and adult residential commu-
nities in arriving at its decision had the O'Connor court acknowledged
their many business qualities.86 The business characteristics of these
communities are apparent, along with various other characteristics par-
ticular to condominiums:
(1) If a person owns a number of condominiums within the
project, he becomes a landlord and thereby subject to
Marina .87
(2) Condominiums, along with their restrictive covenants, are
"born" as business establishments since condominium restric-
tive covenants are recorded by a sole owner, usually the devel-
82. Although the particulars of such an arrangement are beyond the scope of this
article, the services provided by an owners association could be taken care of by the
individual homeowners. As an alternative, the homeowners could hire an outside
party or company to provide maintenance; under this arrangement the services could
be provided as before, but the action taken by the homeowners would be merely to
hire an independant contractor-not to act as a business.
83. Most forms of housing do not even operate through the assistance of owners
associations. See also notes 10-I1 and accompanying text.
84. Although the court's opinion is not totally void of a recognition of other busi-
ness characteristics of condominiums, these aspects were dismissed rather quickly and
the court gave them no more than "footnote treatment."
85. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114 (Ct. App.
1982). See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
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oper, prior to the sale of even a single unit. The developer is
not dealing with an owner-occupied, single family residence
but with a business enterprise. He, and his project, are there-
fore subject to the provisions and restrictions of the Unruh Act
from the outset.
8 8
(3) In addition to the control asserted by the owners associa-
tion of a condominium complex, restrictive covenants can be
enforced by the homeowners of a condominium development
or residential neighborhood in an individual or group capacity.
Thus the homeowners themselves can act as an enforcing body
to restrict the sale and rental of all the dwelling units within
their complex or subdivision, not just their own. This factor
would apply equally as well to the minority of mobile home
parks that sell the individual ground space.
8 9
(4) Most mobile home parks, however, already fall within the
business setting of landlord-tenant as set forth by Marina, since
most parks are owned by a single landlord who rents ground
space to each of the individual mobile home owners.90
(5) Co-op owners are also conspicuously in a business setting
by being shareholders in the corporation that owns the project
in which their unit is located. Their regulation of the corpora-
tion falls directly within the purview of the Unruh Act.91
(6) The courts or legislature may extend the application of
non-discrimination to owners of individual, single family resi-
dences, thus making them come directly within the purview of
the Unruh Act.
92
When the above business characterictics of planned communities are
combined with the Unruh Act's protection of age, the selectiveness in
the O'Connor holding becomes ineffective. Not only does the decision
have limited utility in regulating condominiums, but it has caused age
restrictive covenants to have a selective application.93 A more complete
test is needed.
88. See generally CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355 (Deering Supp. 1983). It is somewhat
disturbing that the majority opinion in the California Supreme Court decision, recog-
nized this contention yet greatly discounted its merit. The court stated in a footnote
"[T]he association.. . could simply cancel that age restriction and adopt one of its
own." O'Connor, 33 Cal. 3d at 795, n. 4, 662 P.2d at 430 n. 4, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 323 n.
4. This conclusion is folly since an owners association cannot even exist until there
are owners, and to obtain such requires first the sale of the units subject to the restric-
tive covenants.
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1355 (Deering Supp. 1983); CAL. CIv. CODE § 798.25
(Deering Supp. 1983).
90. See supra notes 10, 70-71 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, many mo-
bile home parks have misinterpreted California Civil Code sections 798.6 & 799.5,
which authorize the exclusion of children in parksfor senior adults, CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 798.6, 799.5 (Deering Supp. 1983) to illegally create adult only parks where senior
adults do not reside. See also infra notes 125-126, 128 and accompanying text; supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
93. The courts opinion will only affect condominiums with owners associations.
All other types of planned housing will remain untouched.
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B. "Business Establishment'---A Threshold Question
Although it is true that a court decision must be carefully drawn to be
as narrow as possible, narrowness does not mean selectiveness. The re-
sult of such a decision is counterproductive.
94
Since the court focused only on condominiums with owners associa-
tions, a complex that is committed to maintain its child free environment
may dissolve its owners association to thwart the decision. The result
will be less effective and less efficient condominium housing. Due to the
ineffectiveness of the O'Connor opinion, "adult condominium dwellers"
will be inclined to migrate to other forms of housing that presently can
allow the exclusion of children. Housing such as mobile homes and
adult residential communities would currently meet this need.95 The re-
sult of this exodus will be a substantial drop in the value of condomini-
ums, and consequently, fewer will be built due to the resulting lower
profits. On the other hand, if this results in lower priced, more afforda-
ble units for families, the cost impact will be absorbed by mobile home
parks and adult residential communities that will be able to command a
higher price in the adult market.9 6 Regardless of the economic gymnas-
tics that may occur, had O'Connor set forth a more workable approach
to resolve discrimination of age in housing, the present quandry would
not exist.
97
Therefore, the finding of a "business establishment" is merely a
threshold question; the anlaysis is not complete. California needs some-
thing the O'Connor court did not deliver, a complete test that will work
in all forms of housing, a universal test, a test that includes the element
of "reasonableness."
9 8
94. It is obvious that when an opinion renders a solution to a single problem
when that same opinion could have been written so as to set forth a more universal
application to other similar problems, the result is a future of peacemeal, one-step-at-
a-time decisions.
95. As stated, these types of housing do not utilize an owners association.
96. These comments regarding economic ramifications are merely set forth by the
author of this Note as a means of contemplating future economic problems. Only the
future course of condominium developments will be able to track the true economic
phenomenon that may occur.
97. Had O'Connor given a test with a universal application to all forms of hous-
ing, planned housing communities of all types would be able to stabilize their status
regarding minors and children.
98. Justice Broussard apparently saw through the serious limitations of the ma-
jority opinion in his concurrence. He proposed striking down age restrictive cove-
nants under the authority of California Civil Code section'53, which "deals more
specifically with the problem of discriminatory restrictions on the use of [all] real
property." O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 796, 662 P.2d
427, 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1983) (Broussard, J., concurring).
This Note does not specifically delve into the ramifications and applicability of
section 53 to bar discrimination. Therefore, although section 53 does not have the
strong case authority behind it as does the Unruh Act, it may prove to be a much
simpler and direct approach to the regulation of planned housing developments in the
future. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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III. AGE RESTRICTIONS AND THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS
Keeping in harmony with the legislative history of the Unruh Act, the
O'Connor court should have also considered whether age restrictive con-
venants were "reasonable." 99
It is highly unlikely that the O'Connor court would advocate the right
of children to patronize bars or to buy alcoholic beverages. Such action
by children is prohibited by the California Constitution; 10 fines and
penalties await the business owner who sells liquor to a minor or grants a
minor admission into a bar or tavern. 10' Taking the O'Connor decision
to its logical end, however, this is arbitrary discrimination of a class by a
business establishment. The California codes are replete with prohibi-
tions, restrictions, and special treatment of children in business set-
tings.102 Are we to assume that O'Connor advocates a repeal of these
protective laws? The answer is obviously clear, but the O'Connor court
did not explain why housing was singled out from other types of busi-
nesses to not allow age restrictions. Without an overt acknowledgement,
O'Connor was couching its decision in the context of "reasonable-
ness."'1 3 The element of reasonableness is just as much a part of the
Unruh Act as finding the element of a "business establishment."'
'1 4
It is therefore apparent that the proper test for all planned housing is
to collectively take the business characteristics of the particular type of
housing at hand and test it for "reasonableness" against the history and
legislative intent of the Unruh Act.'0 5 Only then can a complete result
99. Early common law classified certain enterprises as public or common call-
ings. In other words, certain enterprises that held themselves out to the community
by providing a particular product or service were affected with a public interest. As
such they were regarded differently than purely private enterprises. The common law
developed imposing certain obligations on these public interest enterprises, one of
which was the duty to serve all customers on reasonable terms without discrimination.
The California Legislature codified such common law principles in 1897, by enacting
the statutory predecessor to the present Unruh Civil Rights Act. 1897 Cal. Stat. 137;
58 Op. Att'y Gen. 608 (1975).
Additionally, California Civil Code section four which is a precursor to the entire
Civil Code, including the Unruh Act (CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1983)),
sets forth the rules of constructing such. It states in full:
The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed, has no application to this code. The code establishes the
law of this state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions
are to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote
justice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (Deering 1971) (emphasis added).
100. CAL. CONsT. art XX, § 22(d).
101. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25658, 25663, 25664, 25665 (Deering 1982).
102. Id. See also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12072, 12550 (Deering 1982) (prohibiting
sale of firearms to minor); CAL. PENAL CODE § 310 (Deering 1982) (excluding minors
from prizefights and cockfights) for a few of the many references to minors within the
California Codes.
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be obtained.
Nonetheless, "reasonableness" could act as a two-edged sword in the
context of age restrictions in housing. It was the test of reasonableness
that the O'Connor appellate court relied upon to initially conclude that
age restrictions could stand. 1° 6 Owners associations maintain that appli-
cation of the Unruh Act to planned housing, and especially its inclusion
of children, is unreasonable. They assert that it is reasonable to exclude
children in light of the mischievous and boisterous propensities they pos-
sess. 107 Such a position is not without some merit and authority, 0 8 but
the test of "reasonableness" is not absolute and therefore demands care-
ful analysis.
The California Civil Code, by express language allows both mobile
home parks and condominium complexes to enact restrictive covenants
if they are "reasonable". 10 9 At the appellate level, the court in O'Connor
concluded that the age restrictive covenants of the Village Green com-
plex were reasonable due to the rights of those adults that desire to insu-
late themselves from the "noise, laughter and occasional boisterousness"
of children. 110 A similar rationale was employed in Ritchey v. Villa
Nueva Condominium Association"' where the owners association was
successful in enforcing an age restrictive covenant upon an owner desir-
ing to rent his unit to a woman with minor children. Both of these appel-
late court decisions discussed the Unruh Act but denied its application to
age restrictive convenants by approving the "reasonableness" of adult
living.112
Although the California Supreme Court did nothing to clarify this
106. We conclude that, Marina, notwithstanding, the restriction in question
is a reasonable one and is not subject to attack as being either arbitrary,
discriminatory or contrary to public policy. It clearly violates no statute and
its enforcement does not involve the court, and thereby the state, in any
constitutionally prohibited activity.
O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111, 118 (Ct. App. 1982)
(citation omitted).
107. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominiums Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 695 (Ct. App. 1978).
108. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1355 (Deering Supp. 1983).
109. CAL. CrV. CODE § 1355 (Deering Supp. 1983), provides in part: "The owner
of a project shall, prior to the conveyance of any condominium therein, record a dec-
laration of restrictions relation to such project, which restrictions shall be enforceable
equitable servitudes where reasonable, and shall inure to a bind all owners of condo-
miniums in the project." (emphasis added).
110. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Ct. App.
1982).
111. 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (Ct. App. 1978).
112. O'Connor, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17;Ritchey, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 693, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 698. The lower court in O'Connor conceded that all other areas of law, and
especially California Civil Code section 12993 would preempt the restrictive cove-
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area in O'Connor, in Marina it dealt with the same "reasonable test" of
excluding children and concluded:
[A]n individual who has committed no... misconduct cannot
be excluded solely because he falls within a class of persons
whom the owner believes is more likely to engage in miscon-
duct than some other group. Whether the exclusionary policy
rests on the alleged undesirable propensites of those of a partic-
ular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, or age, in
this context the Unruh Act protects individuals from such arbi-
trary discrimination. 113
It is clear that a restriction against families with minor children was
held to be both arbitrary and unreasonable in Marina. How then can
this exclusion, under essentially the same facts, in O'Connor114 suddenly
become reasonable simply because the O'Connor case involved home-
owners? The distinction cannot logically lie on the premise that
O'Connor deals with the contractual relationship of homeowners while
Marina deals with "mere tenants." In the final analysis the tenant and
the homeowner alike are equally bound by a contractual agreement, one
by covenant, the other by lease; both must abide by the restrictions of the
development in which they choose to live. Also, regardless of any
preconceived intentions to live in an environment free of children, the
realities of the human experience dictate that in a six hundred unit pro-
ject, the planned or unplanned birth of a child into the home of a unit
dweller or into that of his or her neighbor is a foreseeable reality. Arbi-
trary discrimination of a class, and especially the class which includes
children, cannot be a reasonable restriction'" 5 in planned housing since
reasonable activity must be found within the realm of practicality and
legality. 116
In addition, with the current housing needs in California, it is difficult
to imagine how age restrictions in housing can be found reasonable." 
7
In confirmation of a legislative finding, both Marina and the O'Connor
appellate decision recognized the current housing shortage in Califor-
nia. 118 By barring families with minor children from planned develop-
113. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 726, 640 P.2d 115, 117, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1982).
114. Neither of the children involved in O'Connor nor Marina had committed
any offensive acts or misconduct to make their presence unacceptable.
115. Marina, 30 Cal. 3d at 744, 640 P.2d at 129, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 511. O'Connor
v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 794, 662 P.2d 427, 431, 191 Cal. Rptr.
320, 324 (1983).
116. A possible exception may exist in relation to "elderly" living arrangements.
See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
117. O'Connor, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 116. Marina held: "As the Legislature stated in
1979: 'The Legislature finds and declares that the state's housing problems are sub-
stantial, complex and now of crisis proportions'..." Marina, 30 Cal. 3d at 743, 640
P.2d at 128, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
118. Id. Note also, the median sales price of a new home from 1965 to 1975 rose
seventeen percent. From 1975 to the second quarter of 1978, a short three and a half
1983]
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 20 [2016], No. 1, Art. 15
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss1/15
CALIFORNJIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
ments, many families would be placed under the unreasonable and
unnecessary hardship of being eliminated from what might otherwise be
affordable, adequate housing. This adverse impact is further magnified
in relation to minority groups and female headed households. 1 9 Al-
though this condition of a lack of affordable housing may represent a
transitory economic phenomenon, 120 it is one additional consideration
for the test of reasonableness in approving age restrictive convenants.
121
When a society cannot provide adequate and affordable housing to its
members, it is irrational to restrict occupancy in existing housing for the
benefit of a few.
Furthermore, in striking down age restrictive covenants, if the element
of "reasonableness" is not added to the element of finding a "business
establishment," the ability to circumvent the O'Connor decision is
greatly facilitated. Although the result reached by the California
Supreme Court in O'Connor would appear to help alleviate the housing
problem in California by opening up condominium living to families
with children, 122 condominiums may still: a) impose ridiculously limit-
ing comportment standards upon the activities of children to make the
complex undesirable to families, b) restrict the number of occupants per
condominium or room, c) increase owners association fees dispropor-
tionality, d) dispose of the owners association as previously stated, or e)
construct the complex so as to make child play impractical (or in some
ways unsafe). The additional imposition of reasonableness would elimi-
nate these potential actions.123
year span, an astounding forty percent increase in cost occurred. BUREAU OF CEN-
sus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1978 at 800-01 (8th ed. 1978). In a closer application to the "Unruh Act's domain,"
the cities of Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco collectively average a median
sales price for existing construction at an alarming $120,800 in 1980. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, Quality f Lfe in U S. Metropolitan Area: A Com-
parative Table 71 (1982).
119. The Fair Housing Project of 1979 surveyed rental families in California and
revealed that, statewide, these groups have a greater percentage of households with
children than does the general public: fifty-eight percent for blacks, fifty-five percent
for Hispanics and an astounding sixty-nine percent for female-headed households as
compared to a low of approximately thirty-five percent for male-headed, non-minor-
ity families. The Fair Housing Project, Table ten averages (1979). The above statis-
tics are illustrative of the current social ramifications in the current housing market.
Although statistical data regarding home ownership is not available, the above statis-
tics are illustrative of the current social ramifications in the current housing market.
120. O'Connor, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
121. The "reasonable test" is found in section 1355 of the California Civil Code
for the enactment of condominium restrictive covenants. For mobile home parks, see
CAL. CIw. CODE § 796.56 (Deering Supp. 1983); see supra note 124 and accompanying
text.
122. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 709, 790, 797, 662 P.2d
427, 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 324 (1983).
123. In O'Connor, the Supreme Court stated: "the association therefore is al-
ready faced with the burden of planning for the presence of children." Id. at 796, 662,
P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324. This comment is the sole statement by the court
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Nonetheless, the lower court in O'Connor persisted in defending the
reasonableness of age restrictive convenants by making reference to Cal-
ifornia Civil statutes which authorize "adult only" restrictions in mobile
home parks.' 24 This court began its analysis of these statutes by recog-
nizing that they were passed by the legislature exclusively to provide for
"older" citizens. 125 In its conclusion, however, the court turned its back
on the legislative intent of protecting the elderly and used it as support to
blindly approve all age restrictive convenants.
1 26
Since the California Supreme Court avoided the sharply disputed area
of age restrictive convenants, some discussion is warranted. Statutes au-
thorizing mobile home parks for the elderly were intended to provide a
special exception to the general rule.127 Although some mobile home
parks could be tailored to meet the requirements of these statutes, the
remaining parks are still subject to the same test of reasonableness as are
condominiums regarding age restrictive covenants.1 28 All inclusive age
discrimination in mobile home parks, or any other type of planned hous-
ing, was never the intent of the California Legislature.' 29 A recent Cali-
fornia Attorney General Opinion, published in direct response to the
Marina decision, addressed the issues presented by these statutes.1 30 At-
that addresses "planning for children" in any context. However, in the context of the
opinion, the court is merely making a statement that the Marina decision foreshad-
owed the event of children's inclusion within condominium developments. No state-
ment is made that would tend to impose a duty to create a setting that would be
practical and accommodating to children. Although condominium projects would
want to protect themselves from lawsuits relating to negligence, there is little incentive
for a complex to construct suitable play areas, facilities or layout of the project. Com-
plexes desiring an adult atmosphere will grudgingly comply with O'Connor, but will
foreseeably make every effort to make the complex undesirable to families.
124. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.6, 799.5 (Deering Supp. 1983). Note, although sec-
tion 25 of the California Civil Code defines California's statutory age for adulthood
at eighteen, the application of section 25.1 to "adult" mobile home communities has
been recently questioned by the California Attorney General. 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
559 (1982). See also infra note 133 and accompanying text. As stated infra note 127
and accompanying text, the California Supreme Court avoided this sharply disputed
area altogether.
125. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114 (Ct. App.
1982).
126. The lower court in O'Connor disagreed with the practicality of the statutes,
holding:
Since persons retire at different ages, some at a fairly early age, and since the
definition of what is an "older" citizen varies with the perspective of the
individual (for many purposes, anyone over 50 years of age is a "senior citi-
zen") any legislative definition of those criteria must necessarily be arbitrary
and such criteria itself would contain the seeds for a claim of discrimination
by persons who fall short by a few days of attaining the requisite status.
Id.
127. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,743 n. 11, 640 P.2d 115, 128 n.
11, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 510 n. 11; see also infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
128. California's Civil Code requires compliance to "reasonable rules." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 798.56(c) (Deering Supp. 1983).
129. Id. See also infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
130. 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 559 (1982).
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torney General George Deukmejian supported the statutory language of
allowing "adult only" communities in mobile home parks' 3 ' but based
his support on a recognition "of the special needs of elderly citizens."' 32
Mr. Deukmejian did, however, leave the question open as to what age a
person would have to be to obtain "adult" status in terms of the mobile
home residency law. 133 Although neither the courts nor the California
Legislature have answered Mr. Deukmejian's question with a specific
age requirement, it is conclusive that in this setting, they define "adult"
to be an elderly citizen. 134 Arbitrarily discriminating against families
with minor children is clearly not the purpose of these special parks for
the elderly. The true reason for the exclusion of non-adults from these
parks is based on the special, unique needs of the elderly, and not the
alleged "undesirable propensities" of children. 135 It is a reasonable
exception.
To summarize the above points presented in this Note, a blanket and
arbitrary exclusion of children as a class, from planned housing, is a vio-
lation of the Unruh Act. 136 All forms of planned housing have business
characteristics and their compliance with the Act's provisions must also
meet reasonable standards. 137 Although arguments may be launched
that age discrimination is reasonable and not arbitrary because of the
boisterous propensities of children, 138 Marina overruled this logic as
131. See supra note 124. Attorney General George Deukmejian was elected to
the office of Governor of California in 1982.
132. 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 559 (1982).
133. Id. The opinion, in part, states:
The Mobilehome Residency Law does not define the terms "adults only." It
could mean a rule limiting residents to persons 18 years of age or older. On
the other hand, the term could embrace a variety of more narrowly defined
adult-only rules. An adults only device might mean "45 or older only."
Id. at 561-62 (footnote omitted).
134. 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 559, 561-62 & n. 4 (1982). Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth
Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 71 N.J. 249, 284, 364 A.2d 1016, 1035 (1976) (setting the age of
"adult" at fifty-two years); 12 U.S.C. § 1701(r) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 1485 (1976) (set-
ting an age minimum of sixty-two years for occupancy). See supra note 127 and ac-
companying text.
135. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111, 117 (Ct. App.
1982). Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (Ct. App. 1974) stated: "These
sections represent an implicit legislative finding that not only do older adults need
inexpensive housing, but also that their housing interests and needs differ from fami-
lies with children." Id. at 229, 526 P.2d at 753.
The case of Taxpayer Ass'n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 71 N.J. 249, 364
A.2d 1016 (1976), cited additional needs of the elderly in this regard: limited and
fixed incomes, physical problems, social problems, probability of accidents, falls as
the leading cause of death in persons over sixty-five, need for wider walkways and
fewer stairs, housing design to permit easy social contact, short distances between
buildings, easy refuse collection, lighting problems and their susceptibility to being
victimized, thus an additional need for security. Id. at 268-70, 364 A.2d 1026-28.
136. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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"class discrimination". The Marina court held that under the Unruh
Act, a person's individual conduct is the only basis for discrimination.
1 39
The apparent stalemate between these opposing views, however, carries
with it a workable solution to king and pawn alike.
IV. A SOLUTION
As discussed previously, an exception to the rule barring discrimina-
tion of children has been essentially carved out for adult mobile home
parks. 14° Case law has defined "adult" as elderly citizens,14 ' and has
provided special provisions for their needs and circumstances. 142 Logi-
cally, these special needs for the elderly are not present only in a mobile
home park, but apply wherever senior adults reside as a group. It is by
no means improper to extend the same protection found in mobile home
parks to condominiums, co-ops, or residential housing developments,
where senior adults reside if such a development would meet their needs.
This allowance should be provided, not as an exclusionary measure to
younger persons, but as a protective measure for older adults. Various
cases and opinions have supported special housing for these elderly
adults.' 4 3 However, two essential factors must be established in antici-
pation of possible abuses of this exception: (a) a specific age limit which
bears a substantial relationship to the senior adult's problems must be
determined and universally applied,'" and (b) the facilities themselves
must adequately and realistically meet the needs of the senior adult.
14 5
139. Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 726, 640 P.2d 115, 117, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1982).
140. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
143. Id.
144. Selection of age must not be set too low or else the needs detailed in note 135
supra, will not be met since the truly senior adult will be placed in a community of
younger persons with different needs. Furthermore, an overabundance of senior
adult housing will result in an age limit that is set too low. If a proper age is selected,
the problem of overabundance will remedy itself through supply and demand. Other-
wise, an overabundance of such communities would essentially deprive many persons
of some of the typical, low cost benefits of community type housing. Age sixty-two
appears to be a common selection and would be consistent with factor "a" of the text.
145. The denial of housing accommodations because of one's occupation,
marital status, or number of children, may or may not be violative of the Act
depending on whether any regulations denying such housing accommoda-
tions are reasonable and somehow rationally related to the services per-
formed and the facilities provided. For example, an apartment complex
could justifiably establish itself to serve elderly people, have special facilities
and services for them, and design the complex for maximum quiet and rest-
fulness. Under these circumstances, the denial of an apartment to people
with several children would probably not be "arbitrary" and thus not viola-
tive of the Act. On the other hand, it is doubtful that such an apartment
complex could justify denying an apartment to a person because of his or
her occupation or marital status because such classifications, on their face,
do not necessarily upset the atmosphere the complex is trying to maintain.
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Other than this exception extended to the elderly, the general rule would
be that families with minor children would have the full protection of the
California Unruh Act and be able to enjoy the benefits of planned com-
munity housing.
To assure acceptable behavior by children and adults within the
planned community, proper restrictive covenants could establish reason-
able rules of comportment necessary to create a favorable atmosphere.1
46
In this setting, denial of accomodations would affect only individual ten-
ants who disrupt the atmosphere, not because of an arbitrary class deter-
mination, but because of their own personalities or predelictions.1
47
CONCLUSION
A retrospective analysis reveals that the California Unruh Act has
been broadly written and liberally applied. Recently, the California
Supreme Court, by viewing the age old relationship of landlord-tenant
as a "business establishment," extended the Act's application to bar age
discrimination in rental housing. This was the first big step in barring
arbitrary discrimination by age. Shortly thereafter, the same court faced
the placid argument that planned housing communities are creations of
individual ownership and therefore exempt from the "business establish-
ment" status under the Unruh Act. In apparent readiness, the court
primed and powdered the mighty Unruh Act cannon. The challenge
before it ever deserving a mighty blast, but alas, a single pea issued forth
from the mouth of that mighty muzzel. Although an age restrictive cove-
nant was eliminated at the Village Green complex, the bulk of the prob-
lem continued. This Note concurs with the result reached by the
California Supreme Court in striking down age restrictive covenants in
the context before it. However, it criticizes the unnecessarily narrow and
limited analysis of that opinion. Rather than focusing on the single role
of an owners association as a business establishment, all factors must be
58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 609, 613 (1975); see also 64 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 173 (1981).
146. This could be achieved by employing section 1355 of the California Civil
Code, for condominiums and co-ops, and section 798.56 of the California Civil Code,
for mobile home parks. This solution was also suggested by the California Supreme
Court in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 794, 662 P.2d 427,
429, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (1983).
147. See 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 609 (1975). See also Stouman v. Reilly, 37 Cal.
2d 715, 716, 234 P.2d 969 (1951) (proprietor has no right to exlude or eject a patron
"except for good cause").
In addition, it is true that enforcing rules of comportment on a case-by-case basis
would carry with it difficulties and inconveniences; however, the bad manners of a
few children, or their parents, should not provide the basis to exclude all families with
minor children anymore than should the bad manners of a few members of any
group.
By viewing the entire housing situation as it exists in California at the present time,
dealing with people as individuals and not as groups, would assure a more equitable,
equal, and homogeneous arrangement for all concerned.
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considered collectively, with all types of housing in mind. Only then can
a consistent and reasonable result be reached for all settings. As eco-
nomic and social needs change, so too must the test of reasonableness.
In any event, the single fact of individual property ownership does not
suddenly make the unreasonable, reasonable. At present, an exception
to the invalidation of age restrictive covenants can be made only in com-
munities that are specially created to accommodate the unique needs of
the elderly. This exception need not be limited exclusively to mobile
home parks; but in whatever settings it is applied, it must be strictly con-
strued to assure that its intended purposes are fully and properly carried
out.
Tad D. Draper*
* This article is dedicated to my wife, Christine, whose patience and support
made it all possible.
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